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THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL
SYSTEM: A PROPOSAL
M. C. BASSIOUNI*
INTRODUCTION
Any international scheme must ultimately rest, in the absence of an
international coercive body, on the willful compliance and cooperation of
member-states of the world community. World community proscriptions
will therefore be as effective as world-community participants are desirous
of implementing them. The will to participate in a global system of control
is the only alternative to diehard imperatives of the old self-serving inter-
national politics. Such a commitment can only be attained after the type
of activity and conduct sought to be regulated by world community pros-
criptions have attained a certain level of opprobrium in the common mo-
rality of mankind. Admittedly there will seldom be a uniform level or
homogeneous sense of values amongst all people of the world, consequently
a minimum common denominator must be found.
The dangers of drug dependence' and particularly dangerous drugs are
* Professor of Law, De Paul University; 1971 Visiting Professor of Law N.Y.U.; 1970 Ful-
bright Mays Visiting Professor of International Criminal Law, the University of Freiburg,
Germany; 1972 Visiting Scholar Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Author
of Criminal Law and Its Processes: The Law of Public Order (1969) and The Law of Dissent
and Riots (1971 ed.). With grateful appreciation for the assistance of James R. Silverwood,
B.A. Univ. Illinois; J. D. De Paul.
The author prepared this article in his capacity as Chairman of the World Peace Through
Law Center Commission on International Control of Narcotics. In recognition of the contribu-
tions made by the Board of World Experts, their names are appended. However, the views
expressed herein are solely that of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the
experts.
I It has been recommended that the terms "drug addict" and "drug abuse" are inadequate.
"Addict" means that the individual is physically and psychologically dependent and is taking
excessive amounts of a drug from which he will have both physical and psychological with-
drawal symptoms. The term "abuser" simply connotes that the person is psychologically
dependent, and that the drug he uses will produce psychological symptoms but no great
physiological disorders when the drug is withdrawn. See 32 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
BULL. 721, 722 (1965).
The World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs de-
fines the term "drug dependence" to include all types of compulsive, harmful drugtaking.
See Brill, Medical and Delinquent Addicts or Drug Abusers: A Medical Distinction of Legal
Significance, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 783 (1968).
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too well recognized scientifically to be debated,' and their effect on the user
and consequently on society is also well established. The 1970 Report of
the International Narcotics Control Board stated, "Any assessment of the
present degree of drug abuse throughout the world must conclude that the
gravity of the situation has deepened during the year. Misuse of narcotic
and other dangerous substances has escalated sharply in a number of
countries and the outlook is profoundly disquieting."' Such a commonly
recognized individual and social harm constitutes, therefore, such a mini-
mum common denominator warranting if not compelling cooperation be-
tween nation-states to combat this type of activity.
The obligations which derive from the existence of the contemporary
situation of drug dependence are twofold: effective national controls and
international cooperation to maximize national efforts. This type of inter-
national responsible participation in world community processes is by no
means limited to those nation-states particularly affected by the conse-
quences of the harmful activity but extends to all world community partic-
ipants. A direct consequence of this concept is the development of an
international obligation to combat such criminality in compliance with the
maximum aut dedere aut punire.1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM
It should be stated at the outset of any study on narcotics that there is
no definition of the term. Certainly there are numerous writings which
provide a pharmacological or psychological classification of substances in
terms of their effect on natural organism and behavior. This is the main
reason why municipal legislation and international treaties refer to specific
substances and drugs rather than attempt a broad definitional classifica-
tion. The categories of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs covered
by international agreements are:
1. Opium and its derivative morphine, produced from the poppy seed.
2. Cocaine produced from the coca bush. 3. Cannabis Sativa, or indian
hemp, known as hashish, marijuana, and bhang and other names depend-
ing on its geographic location. 4. Psychotropic substances, which are chem-
ically manufactured drugs and not agriculturally produced.
Not all of these categories have always been the subject of interna-
tional control and even among these categories only a limited number were
included in the original measures which were confined to opium and its
' Inasmuch as some drugs such as cocaine only create psychological dependence while others
such as opium may create both mental and physical dependence, any reference to compul-
sive, harmful drugtaking will hereinafter be referred to as "drug dependence."
U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9 (1970).
See Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. Rav. 1
(1969).
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derivatives. In 1931, a system of international legislation was established
under which new narcotic drugs could be added by decision of an interna-
tional organ, which would be binding upon all signatory states. This man-
datory system applied originally only to certain derivatives of opium and
of the coca leaf, but a protocol adopted on November 19, 1948, extended
it to all narcotic drugs of whatever chemical structure, including drugs
which are made synthetically; the cannabis sativa drugs were, however,
not included.
The 1961 Single Convention took over these classifications and in-
cluded cannabis sativa, but failed to cover psychotropic substances and
that is the reason for the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances.
The international control of narcotic drugs scheme is founded upon
ten multilateral treaties concluded between 1912 and 1961, the last being
the Single Convention of 1961, which came into effect on December 15,
1964.1 The operation of this system of international control rests on na-
tional controls to be established and supervised by individual states within
their territorial jurisdiction and-subject to their constitutional limitations.
The narcotics treaties provide that the signatory states are to adopt appro-
priate legislation, introduce necessary administrative and enforcement
measures, and cooperate with international control organs as well as with
other countries in compliance with treaty provisions.
More than 100 countries are parties to one or more of the conventions,
and are therefore participants in the international control system; and
even countries and territories not bound by any or some of these treaties
nonetheless abide by them (to some extent) in practice. As a result, univer-
sal acceptance of an international control system has been attained, even
though the exercise of effective control measures still leaves much to be
desired as witnessed by the large volume of illicit traffic. A sense of historic
continuity in international cooperation has, however, been achieved and
progress toward more effective controls is developing consistently. Each
Narcotic Convention benefited from the experience of its predecessor and
filled certain gaps while improving previously existing devices. The object
of the system is not to eliminate narcotic substances and drugs, because
of their medical and scientific importance, but to restrict their uses to
these purposes. Thus the dilemma of control and difficulty of enforcement:
to produce some of these substances and drugs which are necessary for
medical and scientific purposes, but to control their production, limit their
use, and curb their abuse.
The international control scheme is predicated on an indirect method
See Waddell, International Narcotics Control, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 310 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Waddell]; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/504, Annex 1, for a note by the Secretary-
General which gives a list of treaties and signatories between 1912 and 1961; LoWEs, THE
GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL (1966) [hereinafter cited as LOWES].
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whereby each state exercises and administers its own control system with-
out interference by an international agency. This is so far necessitated by
the xenophobic attitudes of most nations toward the concept of direct
international controls. In fact, because of such attitudes, only an indirect
scheme of international control could have ever developed. This control
scheme is predicated almost entirely on the cooperation of governments
and has two essential characteristics:
1. It depends almost entirely on voluntary international cooperation, and,
2. It has no coercive powers, only the ability to denounce a violator to the
international community and therefore produce a moral deterrent to insure
compliance.
Although each international narcotic agreement will be discussed sepa-
rately in this article, the ensuing remarks will encompass several of these
agreements to illustrate the two above-mentioned characteristics of the
control scheme.
A. The Estimate System
The system of estimates was introduced by the 1931 Convention and
administered by the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Su-
pervisory Body which were merged by the 1961 Single Convention into the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). They all provided for mea-
sures of quantitative control extending to signatory as well as non-
signatory states. The estimate system is intended to limit the narcotics
supplies of every country and territory in the world to the amounts needed
for medical and scientific purposes. Every state, regardless of whether or
not it is a party to any of these Conventions when they were in force (and
presently under the 1961 Single Convention) is required to furnish its
estimates of narcotics needed for the coming year. The estimate is based
on four factors: The quantity of drugs to be consumed for medical and
scientific purposes; the quantity of drugs to be utilized in the manufacture
of other drugs, drug containing preparations, and other drugs not covered
in the Single Convention; the quantity of drugs necessary for addition to
the special stockpile of drugs held by a country to meet exceptional cir-
cumstances; and, any amount needed to bring the actual stocks on hand
at 31 December of the preceeding year to meet the level to be held as of 31
December of the year to which the estimates relate. If a state fails to send
such an estimate, the then competent international body may make the
estimate and on that basis the maximum amount importable by that
country is established. Though the international body which examines the
estimates submitted by governments never had the power to change them
unilaterally, it may make inquiries with respect both to the estimates as a
whole and to a particular drug. The record of these international bodies
shows governments generally cooperate in furnishing the requested explan-
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ations. Shipments of drugs can be made to a state only within the limits
of the estimates furnished by the importing country or made by the inter-
national body. The INCB (and its predecessor the Permanent Central
Opium Board [PCOB]) can make a determination that the limit of ship-
ments to any country has been reached, and recommend to parties that
they stop either temporarily or permanently the import of drugs, the export
of drugs, or both, from or into the country whose limit has been reached.
The 1953 Protocol contained the strongest enforcement procedures of any
of the international narcotic agreements. Its enforcement provision gave to
PCOB the authority to impose a mandatory embargo upon any party fail-
ing to comply with the provisions of the agreement.
Both the PCOB and presently the INCB also control the quantities of
narcotics supplied to countries by controlling stock piling. If the INCB
finds that a dangerous quantity of drugs is accumulating in any country,
it may recommend under the Single Convention that other states tempo-
rarily or permanently stop shipments of drugs to that country. It may also
make this recommendation if, in comparing the estimates and the statis-
tics furnished by governments, it finds that a country has violated its
treaty provisions relating to the maximum amount of narcotic drugs which
it may manufacture or import, computed on the basis of the estimates.
Although no such recommendation was ever made by the PCOB or INCB,
its authority to do so has nevertheless occasionally influenced governments
to comply more fully with the relevant treaty provisions.
The 1961 Single Convention continues the practice of the PCOB to
request any state, whether party or not party to the 1925 and 1931 Conven-
tions, to explain a condition which, in the view of the Board, indicates an
improper accumulation of narcotic drugs.
B. The Import-Export Certification System
The import certificate and export authorization system constitutes one
of the most important institutions of international narcotics control. Ac-
cording to this system, no legitimate shipments can be sent from one
country to another without an import authorization from the government
of the receiving country and a corresponding export authorization from the
government of the sending country. Thus, by controlling the movement of
legal drugs, this provision enables detection of any country's exceeding its
import maximum.
C. The Disclosure and Dissemination of Information
Governments provide the international control organs with data and
information on which the system depends. These governments maintain
an import certificate and export authorization system for foreign trade,
furnish annual reports and texts of laws and regulations enacted by them
to implement the narcotics treaties, and report seizures of narcotic drugs
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from the illicit traffic and other relevant data. They notify the United
Nations of newly developed substances with possible dependence-
producing properties, and are pledged to place under control drugs which
are found by international control organs to have such properties or to be
convertible into drugs having such properties. The discovery of new chemi-
cals such as LSD/LSD25 resulted in the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances (discussed below). General compliance has always been the
goal of the narcotics control system, for until all countries are bound by
the conventions and implement them in good faith, illicit traffickers will
operate from the territory of non-conforming states and thus prevent the
effective operation of the real power behind international narcotics control,
which is the power of public opinion. The most effective means of assuring
compliance with international obligations according to the terms of the
various narcotics treaties is therefore the weapon of publicity. Publicity in
the realm of drug use and drug dependence is a double-edged sword. Over-
dramatization by the information and entertainment media of the suppos-
edly glamorous cloak-and-dagger aspects of drug trafficking has certainly
been harmful to the efforts of national and international control. Further,
the euphoric "highs" attributed to drug use by well-known musical groups
associated with the "acid rock" culture have greatly hampered efforts to
educate the public with respect to the dangers of drug dependence. On the
other hand, publicity given to the lack of cooperation of a government in
this sphere generally has a salutary effect. Governments are extremely
sensitive to any public outcry that they have failed to cooperate in such a
sociohumanitarian activity. Such publicity is intended to be provided by
published reports of the organs of internatinal control based on informa-
tion furnished by governments (annual reports, laws statistics, estimates,
seizure reports) and by discussions in various United Nations bodies and
dissemination of general information.
D. The Role of International Organizations
The League of Nations and the United Nations have been closely asso-
ciated with these efforts and the administration of this system of indirect
control.
The organs presently functioning under UN auspices are:
1. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and
2. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
The Commission is a policy-making one which succeeded the League of
Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous
Drugs, which was then a general organ of control. The INCB was estab-
lished by the 1961 Single Convention and replaced two specialized admin-
istrative organs: the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Su-
pervisory Body, charged particularly with the supervision of the provisions
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of the narcotics treaties dealing with measures of quantitative control (sta-
tistics and estimates).
The Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs formulate policies, coordinate activities, and supervise the imple-
mentation of international conventions and agreements. They make par-
ticular or general recommendations to governments on these matters from
the World Health Organization.
The technical assistance programs of the United Nations and such
specialized agencies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are made available to govern-
ments seeking to cope with their particular problems in this area.'
E. The Overall Concept
These observations reveal the degree of reliance of the international
control system on the good will of cooperating states and its gradually
developed structures attest to the patience and persistence of those who
for years nurtured its acceptance by generally reluctant states. The in-
articulate premise of the entire system which spans over half a century
(from 1909 to this date) is to reach agreement by as many nations as
possible on attainable objectives. This accounts for the gradual develop-
ment of the system and also for some apparent loopholes and known weak-
nesses which still exist. And yet, in spite of the somewhat patchwork na-
ture of the International Narcotics Control Scheme, much progress has
been made. In reviewing the international control system in its 1970 report,
the INCB stated, "[T]he Board is able to record that, in practical terms,
control over the manufacture and distribution of the substances listed in
the 1961 Convention is such that leakage from licit manufacture and trade
into illicit channels during the year has been minimal."7 The conclusion
to be drawn is that the process of international compromise is neither easy
nor satisfactory, but ultimately it is far better than nothing.
II.
A CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
TO CONTROL NARCOTICS
A. Narcotics Control Prior to the League of Nations
1. The Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909
The realization that some ten million Chinese were opium smokers
and that the practice was extending to other Asian states generated the
UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARcoTic DRUGS (1965).
7 U.N. Doc. E/1NCB/9 (1970).
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proper moral climate for the world's first undertaking to control opium.
Efforts by world political and religious leaders set the stage for this inter-
national conference on narcotic drugs, which led to the signing of the first
treaty three years later. 8 Thirteen powers with interests in the Far East
appointed an Opium Commission which met at Shanghai in 1909. The
delegates to the Commission had no power to draw up or sign any treaty,
the primary motive for convoking the Commission being to discuss the
international ramifications of the Chinese opium problem. In spite of the
regional character of the meeting, the members of the Commission were
already well aware of the wide geographical scope and nature of the narcot-
ics problem. Their work represents the first attempt to deal with the prob-
lem on a multilateral international scale.
The Commission passed nine resolutions dealing with various aspects
of the opium problem. It urged gradual suppression of opium smoking and
recommended measures intended to stop smuggling of narcotics, especially
by prohibiting their export to territories which did not legally permit it.
An appeal was also made to the governments controlling foreign conces-
sions and settlements in China to take various measures to cooperate with
the Government of China, and all concerned governments were strongly
urged to take drastic steps to control the manufacture and distribution of
morphine and other derivatives of opium.
Although the Commission did not establish any binding obligations,
it indicated the direction for future action.
2. The Hague Convention of 1912
The first international narcotics convention was concluded at The
Hague in 1912.1 It established international cooperation in the control of
narcotic drugs as a matter of international law. The principles laid down
in the Hague Convention of 1912 have remained the basis of international
narcotics control. The Convention stipulated that the production and dis-
tribution of raw opium were to be controlled by law; that opium smoking
was to be gradually suppressed; and that the manufacture, sale and use
of manufactured narcotic drugs (i.e., of morphine, other opiates and co-
caine) were to be limited by law exclusively to medical and "legitimate"
needs; manufacturers of and traders in such drugs were also subjected to
a system of permits and recording.
I Until that period, trade in narcotics was legal and encouraged by England, but when by
1909 it was estimated that China had ten million opium smokers England, strongly pressured
by the United States and religious groups, closed the opium trade between China and India.
See House of Commons Resolution of May 30, 1906, 158 PARL. DEB., H.C. (--SER.) 494, 516
(1906). See also Renborg, International Control of Narcotics, 22 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 86
(1957).
International Opium Convention, signed January 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912 (1913), -- T.S.
-- , 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
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B. Narcotics Control Under The League of Nations
Article 23 of the League of Nations covenant provided that the mem-
bers of the League should "entrust the League with the general supervision
over agreements with regard to. . .the traffic in opium and other danger-
ous drugs." The first League Assembly created an Advisory Committee on
Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to assist and advise the
League's Council in these tasks. Among other duties, the Committee initi-
ated various international legislative actions under the auspices of the
League.
1. The Geneva Convention of 1925
The Geneva Convention of February 19, 1925, was a great step forward
in the control of narcotic drugs. 0 Governments were required to submit to
the newly created Permanent Central Opium Board annual statistics con-
cerning production of opium and coca leaves, the manufacture, consump-
tion and stocks of narcotic drugs and quarterly reports on the import and
export of such drugs (including opium and coca leaves). It also established
the system of import certificates and export authorizations requiring gov-
ernmental approval of each import and export.
The Permanent Central Opium Board was established to supervise the
statistical system introduced by the Convention. It was composed of eight
independent experts serving in their personal capacity and not as repre-
sentatives of their governments. The Board was authorized under certain
conditions to recommend an embargo of drug exports to a country which
threatened to become a center for illicit traffic, and thus a danger to other
nations, even if that country was not a party to the Convention.
2. 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating
the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs
The aim of this Convention, signed at Geneva on July 13, 1931, is to
limit world manufacture of drugs to medical and scientific needs." It con-
tains provisions to restrict the quantities of drugs available in each country
and territory. Countries bind themselves not to exceed in their manufac-
ture and imports certain maxima computed on the basis of estimates of
their narcotics requirements. In the case of imports exceeding these max-
ima, the Board may impose an import embargo on the country or territory
concerned. It may also recommend such a drug embargo against a party
to the 1931 Convention which the Board, in comparing estimates and
" International Convention Relating to Dangerous Drugs, signed February 19, 1925, 81
L.N.T.S. 317.
" Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drugs, signed July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543 (1933), - T.S. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301; Wright, The
Narcotics Convention of 1931, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (1934).
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statistics, has found to have violated its treaty obligations regarding the
maxima of narcotic drugs which it may manufacture and import. The
annual analytical statement of estimates and statistics which the Board
is required by the Convention to draw up and the annual report it is
required to make to the Economic and Social Council under the terms of
the 1925 Convention present for the year in question an over-all picture of
the legal trade in narcotics.
Because the Drug Supervisory Body is authorized to make estimates
for parties or non-parties if they fail to supply them and because the Board
has the power to embargo imports which would exceed the estimates for
the country concerned, the system of quantitative controls has nearly uni-
versal application-a necessary condition for its effective operation. The
elements of control contained in the Conventions of 1925 and 1931, and in
the 1948 Protocol (discussed below) are incorporated in the Single Conven-
tion of 1961 (discussed below).
3. The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs
The Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs was signed in Geneva on June 26, 1936,12 and came into effect in
October 1939. It was the last treaty on narcotics concluded under the
auspices of the League of Nations. The parties undertook to enact mea-
sures to prevent offenders from escaping prosecution for technical reasons
and to facilitate extradition for drug offenses. Perhaps the key provision
of the 1936 Convention was the provision that required the Parties to
severely punish "particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of depri-
vation of liberty," the offenses of illicit narcotic trafficking if such offenses
are committed intentionally. This obligation assumed by each Signatory
represented at that time the greatest single advance in the battle to control
illicit drug traffic. Signatories were required to incorporate certain provi-
sions in their final laws such as: the imposition of sentences having a
deterring effect, and to impose prison terms rather than fines; punish
conspiracy, attempts at, and preparatory acts; punish all traffikers within
its jurisdiction, whether nationals or foreigners; and surrender fugitive
offenders to extradition. Among opium-producing and consuming coun-
tries, the last to prohibit its unauthorized use were Macao (1946), Iran
(1955) and Thailand (1959).
The terms of the Convention were deliberately somewhat vague and
general, accompanied by escape clauses, in order to secure adherence by
countries which would otherwise object to stipulations differing basically
from their national standards. It is the only treaty which is not replaced
11 198 L.N.T.S 229; Starke, The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illegal Traffic
in Dangerous Drugs, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1937).
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by the Single Convention and has been left in force among the very few
countries which have not ratified the Single Convention.
C. Narcotics Control Under the United Nations
The United Nations considered it an urgent task to take the initiative
in a control system which had broken down during World War II. The
initiative was taken when, at its first session in 1946, the Economic and
Social Council created the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to carry out the
functions entrusted to the League's Committee on Traffic in Opium and
Other Dangerous Drugs. It was by the Protocol of 1946 that the functions
previously exercised by the League under the various narcotics treaties
concluded before the Second World War were transferred to the United
Nations. The next steps were the Paris Protocol of 1948, which authorized
the World Health Organization to place under international control any
dependence-producing drug, and the Opium Protocol of 1953, which lim-
ited the use of and trade in opium to medical and scientific needs.
1. The Geneva Protocol of 1946
A protocol signed on December 11, 1946, transferred to the United
Nations the function previously exercised by the League under the various
narcotics treaties concluded before the Second World War.' 3
The eight members of the Permanent Central Opium Board are now
appointed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. As for the
Drug Supervisory Body, two of its members are appointed by the World
Health Organization, one by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic
Drugs and one by the Permanent Central Opium Board.
2. The Paris Protocol of 1948
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, at its first session in November-
December 1946, initiated a study of the procedures necessary for bringing
new synthetic drugs under control.' 4 This resulted in the preparation of an
instrument known as the Paris Protocol of 1948. The Protocol was signed
at the Palais de Chaillot on November 19, 1948, and came into force on
December 1, 1949. It authorizes the World Health Organization to place
under full international control any new drug (including synthetic drugs)
which could not be placed under such control by application of the relevant
'1 Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, Open
for Signature December 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230 (1947) & 62 Stat. 1796 (1948), -- T.I.A.S.
1671 & 1859, 12 U.N.T.S. 180. See also Gregg, The United Nations and the Opium Problem,
13 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 96 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Gregg].
'1 Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention
of July 13, 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drugs, -- T.I.A.S. 2308, 44 U.N.T.S. 277.
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provisions (article 11) of the 1931 Convention and which it finds either to
be addiction-producing or convertible into a dependence-producing drug.
It is generally acknowledged that the Protocol has successfully fore-
stalled any large-scale abuse of new addiction-producing drugs that have
come into medical use since 1939.
In accordance with the Protocol, every party thereto is obliged to
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any drug used or
capable of being used for medical or scientific purposes-and not coming
within the scope of the 1931 Convention-which that party considers capa-
ble of producing addiction or convertible into an addiction-producing drug.
The Secretary-General is required immediately to transmit this notifica-
tion to the other states who are parties to the Protocol, as well as to the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to the World Health Organization.
The World Health Organization must then decide whether the drug in
question is addiction-producing or capable of conversion into a
dependence-producing substance. The Secretary-General is advised of the
World Health Organization's decision. He then communicates this deci-
sion to all member states of the United Nations, to the non-member states
parties to the Protocol, to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to the
Permanent Central Opium Board. Upon being informed of a finding by the
World Health Organization that the drug is addiction-producing or con-
vertible into a dependence-producing drug, the states parties to the Proto-
col are bound to subject the substance to the appropriate measures of
control.
The Protocol also stipulates that, on receipt of a communication from
the Secretary-General about a new drug, the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs may decide that the drug in question be put immediately under
provisional control, pending notification of the conclusions of the World
Health Organization.
This protocol received almost universal adherence, but in fact newly
discovered dependence-producing drugs were not brought under effective
international control. This is one of the reasons for the 1971 Convention
on Psychotropic Substances.
3. The 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of
the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in,
and Use of Opium
With the aim of limiting the production of opium to the quantities
needed for medical and scientific purposes, the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs endeavored to bring about an international opium monopoly, with
quotas allocated to the various opium-producing countries and with a sys-
tem of international inspection.
The principal opium-producing and drug-manufacturing countries,
however, could not reach agreement on several important questions, such
NARCOTICS CONTROL SYSTEM
as the price of opium, international inspection, and so on. Consequently
the Economic and Social Council turned to an alternative plan, proposed
in the Commission by France, which formed the basis of a protocol adopted
by the United Nations Opium Conference held in New York in May-June,
1953. This protocol.came into force on March 8, 1963.'
5
The 1953 Protocol limits the use of opium and the international trade
in it to medical and scientific needs and eliminates legal overproduction
of opium through the indirect method of limiting the stock of the drug
maintained by individual states. The Protocol provides for the licensing of
poppy farmers in opium-producing countries and specifying the areas
which may be cultivated. Producing states are under an obligation to set
up an agency to which all the opium thus produced has to be delivered
immediately after harvesting. The Protocol empowers the Permanent Cen-
tral Opium Board (PCOB) to employ certain supervisory and enforcement
measures-such as requests for information, proposals for remedial mea-
sures, and local inquiries, which can, however, be undertaken only with the
consent of the government concerned. The two most forceful measures
found in the 1953 Protocol are found in no other international narcotics
control agreement. First, a closed list of only seven countries-Bulgaria,
Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia-are authorized
to produce opium for export. Such restricted authorization was not in-
cluded in the 1961 Single Convention. Second, article 12 gave the PCOB
the authority not only to recommend but to impose a mandatory embargo
on the import or export of opium or both from or to a country which failed
to carry out the obligations under the Protocol.
In 1963, the position of the United States in reply to questions regard-
ing the continued effectiveness of the opium Protocol was that it continued
to be binding upon its parties notwithstanding the 1961 Single Convention
and the Departmental State Position which will be discussed below.
4. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
The Single Convention of 1961 went into effect 13 December 1964.16
U.N. Doc. E/N.T. (19--); [19- 14 U.S.T. 10, 18 T.I.A.S. 5273; see also LOWES, supra
note 5; Gregg, supra note 13.
16 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 34/22 (1961); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, open for
signature March 30, 1961, [19--] 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204. For its
background see Note, Integration of International Legislation, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1951).
For an analysis see Waddell, supra note 5; Gregg, The Single Convention for Narcotic Drugs,
16 FoOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 187 (1961); Lande, The Single Convention, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION
776 (1962). For a U.S. position report by the U.S. Department of State see 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
802 (1967). For the Convention's effect on marijuana see Note, Effects of the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs upon the Regulation of Marijuana, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 848 (1968).
Parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 are:
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This convention is a milestone in the history of international narcotics
control. More than half the members of the UN ratified the Convention
and a greater number apply its provisions.
The first objective of this Convention was the unified codification of
existing multilateral treaties in this field, with the exception of most provi-
sions of the 1936 Convention on illicit traffic which are to be continued.
As among parties to the Single Convention, all the other eight treaties
cease to exist, and even in the case of the 1936 Convention, its article 9,
relating to extradition, is terminated as between parties to both conven-
tions, and replaced by a provision in the Single Convention.
The new treaty simplified the international control machinery and
changed the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory
Body into a single unit-the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB).
The Single Convention also extended its control system to the cultiva-
tion of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic drugs. It continues
most of the controls on the production of opium laid down in the 1953
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Opium Protocol. The Convention for the first time subjects the harvesting
of cannabis, cannabis resin and coca leaves to the same control require-
ments, as it does for opium. It should be noted that a recent case in the
United States held that the identical criminal treatment of cannabis of-
fenders and heroin offenders violates the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment of the United States of America inasmuch as the differ-
ence between the dependence-producing propensities of the two drugs is
an established fact." In its penal provision, the Single Convention requires
each party-subject to its constitutional limits-to designate as punisha-
ble offenses all intentional violations of its control provisions regarding
cultivation, production, manufacture, trade, distribution, etc., of drugs as
laid down in the treaty. Each such offense is similarly to be considered a
distinct offense and foreign convictions are to be taken into account by
courts for the purpose of establishing extradition. Extradition is recom-
mended in the case of offenses against the provisions of the Convention and
if extradition is not practicable, a foreign offender is to be prosecuted in
the country in which his offense was committed or in the country in which
he was found.
The Single Convention is a flexible and generally accepted treaty
representing the highest common denominator for the acceptance of inter-
national obligations by sovereign countries. There have been some misgiv-
ings expressed, however, that in certain respects, especially in its provi-
sions for the controlling of opium production, it is not as strong as the
earlier treaty it replaces (1953 Opium Protocol). The Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council, while recognizing a
basis for such fears, considers safeguards to make any abuse at least im-
practical, if not impossible, for a state belonging to the community of
nations. In its plenary meeting of 11 November 1970, the Economic and
Social Council adopted a resolution requesting concerted UN action
against drug dependence and establishment of a UN fund for drug depend-
ence control." In its 1930th meeting, 15 December 1970, the General As-
sembly of the UN adopted a resolution calling upon member states and
appealing to non-member states to consider seriously the possibility of
enacting adequate legislation providing severe penalties for those engaged
in illicit trade and trafficking of narcotic drugs.9
1. The Functions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs: (1) Assists
the Council in exercising such powers of supervision over the application
of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs
" See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); People v. McCabe, -- Ill. -- , 275
N.E.2d 407 (1971); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC
ORDER 150-51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI].
U.N. Doc. E/Res. 1559 (SLIX) (1970).
U.N. Doc. A/Res. 2720 (XXV) (1971).
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as may be assumed by or conferred on the Council; (2) carries out such
functions entrusted to the League of Nations Advisory Committee on
Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs by the international conven-
tions on narcotic drugs as the Council has found necessary to assume and
continue; (3) advises the Council on all matters pertaining to the control
of narcotic drugs and prepares such draft international conventions as may
be necessary; (4) considers what changes may be required in the existing
machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs and submits pro-
posals to the Council; (5) performs such other functions relating to narcotic
drugs as the Council may direct.
A division of the Secretariat of the United Nations, transferred in 1955
from New York to Geneva, it is in charge of administrative and research
duties in the field of narcotics. It includes a laboratory, which is entrusted
with scientific research and coordinates research carried on by scientists
of individual countries. The Commission is composed of 24 members.
2. The Functions of the INCB. Unlike the Commission this is not a
UN-created board but is a product of the narcotics treaties and its incum-
bents consist of 11 persons. It: (1) Enforces the provisions of the Conven-
tion; (2) secures estimates of drug requirements, existing stocks, produc-
tion and consumption statistics and statistics on seizures of unlawfully
held drugs and publishes results; (3) requests information, explanations
and public declarations by governments; (4) recommends embargoes on
imports and exports; (5) gathers and publishes texts of laws and regula-
tions concerning narcotics from signatory states.
a. Weaknesses of the Single Convention*
These weaknesses can be summarized in the following areas:
1. It rests essentially upon faithful cooperation by all parties in the
context of their national decisions rather than upon effective international
measures.
2. The limited authority given the international control bodies-the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control
Board-is apparently inadequate to halt or even to slow down the increas-
ing illicit traffic.
3. The Convention lacks a precise obligation, machinery and incen-
tives for preventing over-production of drugs such as a mandatory em-
bargo.
4. It fails to clearly prohibit production of certain medically and
scientifically unnecessary substances and drugs.
5. It has no direct controls over the execution of any treaty provision,
particularly with respect to production controls which are very indirect.
* See, however, the 1972 Geneva Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention below
which dealt with some of these weaknesses.
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6. It has no assignment of production quotas or production ceilings.
7. It does not prevent countries from entering into the production
market.
8. The denunciation of the Convention is rather facile and operation
outside its ambit is possible (to wit: the People's Republic of China).
9. There is no international enforcement machinery (Interpol has no
jurisdictional authority).
10. There are no international sanctions applicable to individual of-
fenders. The Convention only requires each Party to punish an offender
under its own law if it sees fit to do so. Each Party has the right to refuse
to effect the arrest or grant extradition where it feels the offense is not
"sufficiently serious."
11. The Convention does not apply to psychotropic substances.
12. It has no requirement to show where narcotic drugs are being
cultivated and/or manufactured.
13. The limitations on the amounts of narcotic drugs that a country
may stockpile are not as extensive as those in the 1953 Protocol.
14. The use of counterfoil books in the writing of prescriptions and
the requirement that all written material referring to drugs carry the inter-
national non-proprietary name are not mandatory obligations.
Since a discussion of these areas cannot be effective without proposing
an alternative, it will be dealt with in the conclusion of this article; how-
ever, the position of the United States concerning some of these weaknesses
was presented in its working paper submitted to the Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs and is as follows:20
First, the efforts made in the 1953 Protocol to limit the production of
opium to seven named countries were rejected by the provisions of the Single
Convention. Instead of continuing the international effort to limit the num-
ber of countries permitted to produce opium for export, the 1961 Convention
permits any country to do so-with certain limitations. Instead of firm inter-
national commitments limiting the production of opium, the Convention
leaves the determination of such matters to the individual parties. Important
decisions, such as whether manufacture and trade in the most dangerous
drugs, heroin for example, will be permitted, is left entirely to the opinion of
each individual party. Whether a party will initiate the production of opium
or increase its existing production is left to the discretion of that party subject
to only very general guidelines regarding over-production.
Second, the powers of the international control bodies are essentially to
make recommendations. Aside from the authority of the Commission to add
new drugs to the Schedules annexed to the Convention or transfer a drug
from one Schedule to another, the Commission may only consider matters
20 Working paper submitted by the United Nations to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
U.N. Doc. E/CN - /341 (1970).
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pertaining to the aims of the Convention, call certain matters to the attention
of the Board, make recommendations regarding the implementation of the
Convention, and draw the attention of non-parties to decisions and recom-
mendations made under the Convention.
The Board's authority is similarly limited. It may study, ask questions
about, and make determinations with respect to estimates submitted on drug
requirements and make recommendations thereon. It may make recommen-
dations to the parties that they stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs,
or both from a country or territory. It may also notify countries to stop
exports to a country which has imported drugs exceeding its estimates. It is
powerless, however, to conduct on-the-spot investigations unless invited to
do so. Its sources of information rest almost completely upon governments.
There are very limited possibilities for checking on the accuracy or complete-
ness of information submitted.
Third, the Convention provides neither the effective machinery nor the
incentive to prevent over-production which feeds the illicit traffic in opium
and its derivatives. The requirements for reporting are such that except for
imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw-which must be reported
quarterly-at least a year elapses before the Board can be aware of an over-
production of opium or of synthetic drugs having the same effects. Such
overproduction becomes a source and pressure for illicit traffic.
b. Suggested Amendments to the Single Convention: The American
Position
Amendments to the Convention can be made by proposal of any one
signatory state as long as there are not objections from other signatories
or by a conference called ECOSOC (art. 47). The amendments being con-
sidered by the United States have two basic objectives: (1) to establish
enforceable controls and control machinery to assure the necessary limita-
tions, both on producers and manufacturers, and (2) to provide induce-
ments to parties to faithfully perform all their treaty obligations, as well
as assistance, so that they can take the necessary steps to limit the produc-
tion of opium and operate effective domestic narcotic control systems.
These objectives would be accomplished by the following measures:
1. A new Annex to the Single Convention would specify quotas not only for
the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of opium, but also for
the manufacture and export of opium derivatives and synthetic substances
having effects similar to opium or its derivatives;
2. The Commission would be authorized (a) to decide annually the quotas
for the following opium year; (b) to collect and verify information required
for performing its functions, including the authority to send inspectors into
a State or territory producing opium or manufacturing narcotic drugs to
investigate conditions therein; (c) to adopt remedial measures if a State
seriously exceeds an approved quota; (d) to administer a fund to provide
significant assistance to governments desiring to limit opium production or
to improve domestic control systems; and (e) to collaborate with and assist
other international organizations and governments in the prevention of add-
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iction and in therapeutic measures such as education, rehabilitation and
social programs. It is recognized that an Implementation Assistance Fund
under the Single Convention may not be necessary if the proposed Special
United Nations Fund for Drug Control is established and becomes operative.
In a letter dated 18 March 1971, from the Permanent Representative
of the USA to the UN, Mr. George Bush, addressed to the Secretary-
General, it was proposed to convene a plenipotentiary conference early in
1972 to amend the Single Convention by strengthening the International
Narcotics Control Board in five areas:
2 1
1. Access to information. The Board can at present require States to provide
only information relating to consumption of drugs, stocking of drugs, utiliza-
tion of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, and import and export of
drugs. We propose, in amending articles 14, 19, and 20 to give it the impor-
tant additional authority to inquire about the cultivation of the opium poppy
and the production of opium in a State party to the Single Convention. This
will allow the collection of information about the raw material of narcotics
from which illicit diversion normally occurs.
2. Opportunity to make use of all available information. The Board may
now base its actions only on information officially submitted by a Govern-
ment under an article of the Single Convention or communicated to it by
United Nations Organs. We propose, by amending article 14, to add to this
authority so that the Board could act on the basis of all information that may
become available to it by any means, not only information officially submit-
ted but also other information, which it may obtain through public or private
sources. This will be a particularly useful addition to its powers since the
official information released by governments often does not and cannot pro-
vide data that is relevant to illicit diversion.
3. Local inquiry. The rapid spread of hard narcotics addiction has demon-
strated the need to give the Board authority, in certain instances, to desig-
nate, with the agreement of the State concerned, an individual or a team to
make on-the-spot inquiry of drug-related activities. We propose to give the
Board this authority by amending article 14.
4. Power to modify estimates. The Single Convention requires parties to
furnish the Board estimates on consumption of drugs, stocking of drugs, and
use of drugs to manufacture other drugs. These estimates are in turn linked
to manufacture and importation of drugs. The Board now may only question
these estimates; it may not change them. We propose that in addition to
requiring estimates for the first time on cultivation of the opium poppy and
production of opium, the areas where the threat of illicit diversion is greatest,
the Board be given new authority to modify estimates submitted by States.
This will permit the Board to control narcotics activity that is a real or
potential source of illicit diversion and to conform that activity to world
medical and scientific requirements as determined by experts. We propose,
1, U.N. Doc. E/4971(L) (1971).
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therefore, to amend articles 12, 19, and 24 and to insert a new article 21 vis
entitled "Limitation of Production of Opium."
5. Mandatory embargo. The Board may now only recommend certain steps
to States parties, including that they cease export and/or import of drugs to
or from a particular country when the Board believes the aims of the Single
Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of the
country concerned to carry out the provisions of the Convention. We propose,
by amending article 14, to give the Board the power to make such an embargo
mandatory upon all parties in the above circumstances or when it determines
that, regardless of intent or negligence, there is a danger that any country or
territory is becoming a center of illicit traffic. As at present, the country
concerned would continue to have the right to appeal to the Economic and
Social Council as the political body primarily responsible for supervision of
the Single Convention. If these amendments are adopted, the international
community will be able for the first time to require, as a matter of right, full
information on the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of
opium, to order reductions in cultivation or production where there is a
significant danger of illicit diversion or where world needs are already being
met, and to order worldwide remedial measures to be taken.
Additionally, the United States believes it would be desirable, by amending
article 36, to strengthen the extradition provisions contained in the Single
Convention along the same lines as the New Convention for Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft recently adopted at The Hague. Narcotics off-
ences already enumerated in the Single Convention would thus immediately
become extradictable offences.
The United States has suggested further amendments to the Single Con-
vention. The recommendations suggest that the Board be empowered to
recommend to UN authorities that financial and technical assistance be
provided to a State in support of its efforts to fulfill its obligations under
the Single Convention.
The membership of the Board should be increased from eleven to
thirteen individuals so that better geographic representation may be
achieved.
The Board should be empowered to approve the sale for export of
opium seized in illegal traffic. Such approval would be made on a case by
case basis.
Additional measures should be taken to control the coca leaf and its
potentially dangerous products, including cocaine.
The United States was always at the forefront of international controls
although some may doubt its altruism since it is the world's largest con-
suming nation of legal and illegal drugs. The real test for American credi-
bility will be in two rather different areas. One will deal with rehabilitation
and treatment of drug offenders which the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 contemplates, but for which the United
States still has insufficient facilities; the other will be in connection with
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In the latter case the
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United States is the world's largest producing nation, and those nations
which produced other substances had for years suffered the brunt of Amer-
ican criticism but today the shoe is on the other foot. The United States
is keeping negotiations for amendments to the Single Convention separate
from negotiations on the Psychotropic Convention. As to the former, its
position, as discussed above, is for more controls, but as to the latter, it is
not so much in favor of international controls, a position shared by other
European industrial nations with strong chemical industries.
c. The 1961 Single Convention and the 1953 Opium Protocol
The Single Convention extends its control system to the cultivation
of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic drugs including the
production of opium as laid down in the 1953 Opium Protocol. The view
that the Single Convention replaces the 1953 Protocol is based upon the
provisions of article 44 of the Single Convention which reads as follows:
The provisions of this Convention, upon its coming into force, shall, as
between Parties hereto, terminate and replace the provisions of the following
treaties:
(i) Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy
Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of
Opium, signed at New York on 23 June 1953, should the Protocol have come
into force.
The United States Department of State in 1963 held a different posi-
tion to which it presumably still adheres to since it has not officially
changed it so far. 22 So as to avoid misunderstanding of this position, it is
quoted in its entirety as follows:
As the 1953 Protocol entered into force on March 8, 1963, the entry into
force of the Single Convention will require consideration of three categories
of obligations between States parties to the Protocol, namely:
1. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that do not become
parties to the Single Convention.
2. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that do not become
parties to the Single Convention and Parties to the Protocol that be-
come Parties to the Single Convention.
3. Obligations between parties to the Protocol that become parties to
the Single Convention.
The obligations among the first group of parties to the Protocol, those
that do not ratify the Single Convention, are not affected in any manner
by the Single Convention. The intent of the Single Convention is to termi-
nate and replace the Protocol only as between parties to the Convention.
22 Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Continued Application of the 1953
Opium Protocol, 57 AM. J. INTL L. 896 (1963).
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The obligations in the second group, namely, those involved in rela-
tions between the parties to the Single Convention, on the other hand, are
likewise unaffected by the provisions of the Single Convention. As long as
at least one State remains a party to the Protocol without becoming a party
to the Single Convention, that one State can demand that all the other
parties to the Protocol, even though they have become parties to the Single
Convention, must observe their obligations under the Protocol to that one
State. It should again be noted that the Single Convention does not at-
tempt to relieve parties to the Protocol that become parties to the Single
Convention from their obligations to parties to the Protocol that have not
become parties to the Single Convention.
In considering the third group of obligations, namely, those between
States parties to the Protocol that become parties to the Single Conven-
tion, we are immediately faced with the language that the Convention
shall replace and terminate the Protocol as between parties to the Conven-
tion. A question arises whether that language is binding upon any State
that does not become a party to the Convention. For example, how can
States parties to the Protocol be bound by that language in the Convention
unless and until they become parties to the Convention? In view of the
continuing treaty obligations between the parties to the Protocol that do
not become parties to the Single Convention and the parties to the Protocol
that become parties to the Single Convention, the latter group will be
required, in their relations with each other, to continue to observe their
obligations under the Protocol. The Protocol, like most of the earlier inter-
national instruments regarding narcotic drugs, is intended to be world-
wide in its application. It is intended to impose obligations upon each
party not only with respect to their relations with other parties to those
instruments but also with respect to their relations with States that have
not become parties.
Heretofore, except for certain provisions of the 1912 Narcotics Conven-
tion being replaced by the 1925 Convention, and certain depositary provi-
sions being changed by the 1946 Protocol, each of the international narcot-
ics agreements that has been brought into force has simply added to, rather
than changed, existing obligations. None of the narcotics agreements con-
cluded prior to the Single Convention of 1961 has in any manner relaxed
controls previously established; they have added to and strengthened the
existing controls. The Single Convention of 1961, has, however, omitted
several of the controls embodied in the 1953 Protocol, for example, the
closed list of producers of opium for export, and the provisions on limita-
tions on stocks. In view of this, along with the intended world-wide appli-
cation of the Protocol, the States that remain parties to the Protocol but
do not ratify the Single Convention have a perfect right under interna-
tional law to insist that all States parties to the Protocol continue to
observe, with respect to every other State, the restrictions imposed by the
Protocol, even though some of those states become parties to the Single
Convention.
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The provisions of article 44 of the Single Convention, relating to the
replacement of the Protocol as between States parties to the Single Con-
vention, cannot apply in certain respects, for the simple reason that those
provisions do not relieve those States of their obligations vis-d-vis the
parties to the Protocol that are not parties to the Single Convention. It may
be true that States parties to the Single Convention can, as between
themselves, give effect to certain provisions thereof, but only to the extent
that the rights and obligations involved are of concern solely to them and
do not affect in any way the rights and obligations under the Protocol of
States that, being parties to the Protocol, have not become parties to the
Single Convention. If any action by States parties to the Single Convention
is contrary to the terms of the Protocol, even though entirely in accord with
the terms of the Single Convention, any State a party to the Protocol and
not to the Single Convention will have a right to protest against violation
of the terms of the Protocol, particularly if its rights under the Protocol
are being contravened. To put it another way, States parties to the Single
Convention cannot appropriately do anything under the terms of that
Convention if what is done is contrary to any of the terms of the Protocol
as applied to States that are parties to the Protocol and not to the Single
Convention.
Accordingly, the entry into force of the Single Convention will not
relieve States parties to that Convention from any of the obligations they
entered into under the Protocol. The same principle applies to all the other
existing international agreements on narcotics. In the case of those other
instruments, parties can now withdraw on one year's notice or less, but
notice of termination of the Protocol can be given only after five years have
elapsed from March 8, 1963, the date of its entry into force.
Established principles of international law indicate that the position
taken by the United States has considerable validity. A commonly under-
stood principle in the international law of treaty interpretation states that
a treaty can only be terminated by a unanimous decision of the parties to
the agreement. Lord McNair stated,
the parties who concluded a treaty can lawfully terminate it by agreement,
express or implied. This statement presupposes that they alone are interested
in the continued existence and that no third party has acquired an interest
in its preservation. 3
It would appear that since some parties to the 1953 Protocol have not
signed the 1961 Single Convention which attempted to terminate the 1953
agreement, those parties would have an interest in its preservation. The
principle of projecting genuine expectations would give such parties a justi-
L. McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATIES 506 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
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fled right to have the provisions of the 1953 Protocol recognized and en-
forced.24 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states in
article 30,
Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter the rights and obliga-
tions of states parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject
matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs:
• . . 4 (b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only
to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obliga-
tions.25
From the foregoing it may be forcefully argued that some parties to the
1953 Protocol have acquired and retained enforceable rights under this
document. International law requires all states, whether signatories to the
Single Convention or not, to honor the rights of such parties. The following
hypothetical example will provide an illustration of the problem at hand.
Under the 1953 Protocol only seven countries are permitted to export
opium. No such limitation is contained in the Single Convention. If coun-
try A (party to 1953 and 1961 agreements) sells opium to country B (party
to 1953 and 1961 agreements) country A would be in violation of interna-
tional law with respect to country C (party to 1953 Protocol), assuming
country A is not one of the seven countries authorized to sell opium under
the 1953 Protocol.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that the 1953 Protocol and all
other international narcotics control agreements are still valid interna-
tional law to the extent enforcement of the provisions of the Single Conven-
tion infringes upon the rights of states parties to the prior agreements but
not parties to the Single Convention.
5. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
Strict international controls over LSD, mescaline and similar sub-
stances-including regulations more rigorous than existing controls for
other drugs such as morphine, for example-are provided for in this new
international agreement adopted by a United Nations Conference in Vi-
enna, 19 February 1971.21
The agreement, known as the Draft Protocol on the Control of Psycho-
tropic Drugs Outside the Scope of the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961, covers 32 substances having hallucinogenic effects on the
24 See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 156-86 (1967).
25 U.N. Doc. A/Conf 39/27 (1969).
26 E/Conf. 58/6 19 Feb. 1971;/ see for its history the records of the Commission which, at its
23d session, 13 Jan. 1969, adopted a draft protocol thereafter submitted to governments for
comment by June 30, 1969. For text of draft, see U.N. Doc. E/4606/Rev. 1, Annex IV (May
1969), also in 8 Int'l Leg. Materials 769, July 1969.
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human organism including "pep pills" which stimulate the central nervous
system, barbiturate-type sleeping pills and tranquillizers which are de-
pressants.
The substances are listed in four schedules annexed to the Conven-
tion, which provides for varying degrees of control over the substance in
each schedule. They are: Schedule I-DET, DMHP, DMT, lysergide,
LSD, LSD-25, Mescaline, Parahexyl, Psilocine, Psilotsin, Silocybine,
STP, DOM, Tetrahydrocannabinols, and all Isomers. The items listed in
Schedule I are subject to a special provision (article 7) which prohibits all
use except for scientific and very limited medical purposes. Schedule
II-Amphetamine, Desamphetamine, Methamphetamine, Methylpheni-
date, Phencyclidine, Phenmetrazine. Schedule II-Amobarbital, Cyclo-
barbital, Glutethimide, Pentobarbital, Secobarbital. Schedule
IV-Amfepramone, Barbital, Ethchlorvynol, Ethinamate, Meprobamate,
Methaqualone, Methylphenobarbital, Methprylon, Phenobarbital, Pi-
pradrol and SPA.
This convention as its title suggests deals with Psychotropic or syn-
thetic substances and the term "synthetic" narcotics is generally applied
to a number of dependence-creating substances which came on the market
in 1939, when a German periodical reported the discovery of a synthetic
drug, later called pethidine, with strong analgesic properties. There is a
difference in the basic raw material used in "natural" and "synthetic"
drugs on the basis of the original ingredients used or what by-products or
derivative materials it comes from. This difference is not always significant
since it is possible to manufacture "synthetic" narcotics from vegetable or
animal products, and even poppy straw might be used as a raw material
for production of some chemicals that could be used in making a synthetic
narcotic. That is why the prohibited substances are specifically listed by
schedule in the Convention and are likely to be changed as discoveries
develop.
The new synthetic products raise new control problems resulting from
their growing number, lack of experience with their use and from the fact
that they can be made from materials widely used in industry and easily
accessible even to amateur chemists.
The mushrooming development of various new synthetic drugs and
their appearance on the market, sometimes under false or misleading
claims that they do not produce dependence, have led the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs to issue repeated warnings to governments to apply mea-
sures of control on these substances, pending the definite establishment of
their effects by WHO. The Commission has taken the view held by scien-
tists and law enforcement agencies that commercial interests must yield
to overriding considerations of public health and be subjected to greater
controls. In this connection, it has also been suggested, without encroach-
ing upon the freedom of the press, that a way should be sought to prohibit
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misleading publicity and advertising of properties of newly developed
drugs but this suggestion has yet to be adopted in most countries. Greater
controls over the manufacturing, labelling, advertising and sale of drugs
with stimulant-depressant effects and with dependence-creating proper-
ties should be exercised. In the United States, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration exercises mild supervision, while the Federal Trade Commission
and Health and Commerce Commissions exercise at best benign or nomi-
nal supervision.
Control mechanisms should be instituted through identification of
packages containing such drugs, the use of non-proprietary names, the
control of intermediary products, limitation of the number of narcotics in
circulation and dissemination of information to the medical and allied
professions on matters connected with these drugs, but few if any of these
ideas have been effectively put in force.
Scientific data is also lacking as to the effects of these drugs even
though since 1953 a research program has been undertaken by WHO on
certain basic problems arising from the development of synthetic narcot-
ics. Results of this study have appeared in a series of reports entitled
Synthetic Substances with Morphine-like Effects, but the WHO lacks the
resources to pursue its work effectively. Furthermore, few nations allocate
much resources to such research and even when scientific data is compiled,
its international dissemination is limited and seldom, if ever, is it pre-
sented to the public in an informational or educational manner.
Among the many problems to be resolved is that of the make-shift
laboratory which is perfectly capable of producing most of these sub-
stances. One solution to most of the problems is to treat dependence and
thus curb the demand as well as attempt to control the supply.
These considerations were most prevalent in the mind of the drafters
of this Convention, but as in all previous treaties, the divergent interests
of government, private industry and other interested groups were not likely
to permit a more effective treaty to be drafted, let alone to be signed and
ratified. Thus, once more a treaty is borne out of a spirit of pragmatism
wherein the desire to have at least some control system prevailed over
those who advocated none or an unattainable system in the present context
of Realpolitik.
a. Analysis of the Provisions of the Convention and a Brief Compari-
son with the 1961 Single Convention
The Convention relies on the same scheme contemplated by the 1961
Single Convention and in fact its provisions are almost alike. It relies on
the element of notice by a party that a substance previously uncontrolled
should be subject to:
(i) require licenses for manufacture, trade and distribution as provided in
article 8 for substances in Schedule II;
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(ii) require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing as provided in
article 9 for substances in Schedule II;
(iii) comply with the obligations relating to export and import provided in
article 12, except in respect to another Party having given such notice for
substance in question; (art. 7(a)).
It makes, however, more use of the expertise of WHO particularly if the
World Health Organization finds:
(a) That the substance has the capacity to produce
(i) (1) a state of dependence, and
(2) central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in
hallucination or disturbance in motor function or thinking or be-
haviour or perception or mood, or
(ii) similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in Schedule I,
II, III or IV, and
(b) that there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely
to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warrant-
ing the placing of the substance under international control, the World
Health Organization shall communicate to the Commission an assessment
of the substance, including the extent or likelihood of abuse, the degree of
seriousness of the public health and social problem and the degree of useful-
ness of the substance in medical therapy; together with recommendations on
control measures, if any, that would be appropriate in the light of its assess-
ment. (art. 2-4)
Providing for special means of controlling such preparations, the Con-
vention relies on the same indirect method of the previous narcotics treat-
ies, but some of the escape clauses are, however, quite noticeable. One such
clause is article 3-2 which exempts countries from certain requirements
under articles 8, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 22 whenever the:
preparation containing a psychotropic substance other than a substance in
Schedule I is compounded in such a way that it presents no, or a negligible,
risk of abuse and the substance cannot be recovered by readily applicable
means in a quantity liable to abuse, so that the preparation does not give rise
to a public health and social problem. ...
Such a finding is made unilaterally by a party seeking the exemption
for one or more of the measures of control. Such a party shall notify the
Secretary-General of any such decision, of the name and composition of
the exempt preparation, and of the measures of control from which it is
exempted. The Secretary-General shall transmit the notification to the
other Parties, to the World Health Organization and to the Board, who
may, however, make a different finding and advise the Secretary-General
and the Commission shall decide if the substance should be controlled.
The method of recordkeeping and control, from manufacture to con-
sumption, via distribution, warehousing, and shipment is left to each sig-
natory without international control and is, therefore, likely to prove inex-
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istent or at best ineffective. The Commission and the Board undertake
essentially the same functions as they do with respect to the 1961 Single
Convention. Secretary of State William Rogers, in his letter of submission
to the President transmitted to the Senate with the request that the Con-
vention be ratified by the United States, stated:
There are a number of significant differences between the two Conven-
tions, including the following. The new Convention does not undertake to
control the cultivation of plants from which psychotropic substances may be
derived as in the case of the Single Convention with respect to narcotic drugs.
Provision is made in the new Convention that assessments by the World
Health Organization are determinative as to medical and scientific matters
with respect to psychotropic substances. Decisions by the United Nations
Commission on Narcotic Drugs to place a new psychotropic substance under
control or to change existing controls over a substance must be by a two-
thirds majority of members. With respect to controls over narcotic drugs
under the Single Convention they are binding immediately upon receipt by
the parties of notification thereof. Corresponding decisions under the new
Convention regarding psychotropic substances are not binding until 180 days
after their receipt; a party may take an exception to such a decision and
apply a lower category of controls to the substance. The manufacture, export,
import and use of substances in Schedule I of the new Convention is more
restricted than drugs in the comparable Schedule of the Single Convention.
No annual estimates of quantities of psychotropic substances are necessary
under the new Convention as in the case of narcotic drugs under the Single
Convention. Under the Single Convention preparations containing a drug
under control are subject to all the controls to which the drug itself is subject
except where lesser controls may be applied after the preparation has been
included in Schedule 11m to that Convention, but under the new controls to a
preparation if the party exempts the preparation, such exemption is subject
to replacement by a decision of the Commission to terminate the exemption
of the preparation from any or all control measures.
The difference between the two Conventions arise basically from the fact
that the world community has had over half a century of experience in the
application of international controls to narcotic drugs beginning with The
Hague Convention of 1912, and has had no such experience with respect to
the psychotropic substances; the production of narcotic drugs is of far more
economic and social significance to countries that cultivate the opium poppy
and the coca bush than the manufacture of the psychotropic substances is
to the manufacturing countries; there are a great many more kinds of psycho-
tropic substances than there are of narcotic drugs, and the quantities of
psychotropics manufactured are much greater than the quantities of narcot-
ics manufactured."
n Message from the President of the United States transmitting copy of the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna 21 Feb. 1971, to the Senate, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.,
June 29, 1971 G.P.O. 65/118, Vol VII.
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The distinctions between the two Conventions are not limited to those
cited in Secretary Rogers' letter. The Psychotropic Convention permits
international travelers to carry small amounts of substances for personal
use provided such substances were lawfully obtained. The Single Conven-
tion makes no such allowance. All manufacturing, trade and distribution
of psychotropic drugs must be licensed under the new Convention unless
a Party applies for an exemption because of exceptional circumstances.
The Single Convention requires no form of licensing for the manufacture,
trade or distribution of narcotic drugs if said activities are conducted by
government enterprise. The new convention requires the Parties to set up
a system of inspection regarding the manufacture, trade, distribution or
medical or scientific use of any psychotropic substance. No such require-
ment is imposed by the Single Convention. The provisions with respect to
actions to be taken against illicit traffic are identical except for the addi-
tional requirement in the 1971 Convention that any Party discovering an
instance of illicit trafficking shall immediately report such incident to any
other Party directly concerned. The 1971 Convention contains no explicit
provision allowing for the seizure and confiscation of illicit drugs as does
the 1961 Single Convention.
b. The Penal Provisions and Sanctions Approach in the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances and the Single Convention
The territorial principle of jurisdiction is invoked in both Conventions
as it is throughout all of the narcotics treaties, but concurrently, signato-
ries are urged to prosecute or alternatively extradite individual violators
on the additional theory of "universality" because violation of the narcot-
ics treaties constitute an "international crime." Article 22 of the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances and article 36 of the Single Convention
relate to the penal provisions of their respective Convention. Both articles
are identical and state:
Subject to the constitutional limitations of a Party's legal system and domes-
tic law:
(a)
(i) if a series of related actions constituting offences under paragraph
1 has been committed in different countries, each of them shall be
treated as a distinct offence;
(ii) intentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts
to commit, any of such offences, and preparatory acts and financial
operations in connection with the offences referred to in this article,
shall be punishable offences as provided in paragraph 1;
(iii) foreign convictions for such offences shall be taken into account
for the purpose of establishing recidivism; and
(iv) serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by na-
tionals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose terri-
tory the offences were committed, or by the Party in whose territory the
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offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the
law of the Party to which application is made, and if such offender has
not already been prosecuted and judgment given.
(b) It is desirable that the offences referred to in paragraph 1 and paragraph
2 (a) (ii) be included as extradition crimes in any extradition treaty which
has been or may hereafter be concluded between any of the Parties, and, as
between any of the Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty or on reciprocity, be recognized as extradition crimes;
provided that extradition shall be granted in conformity with the law of the
Party to which application is made, and that the Party shall have the right
to refuse to effect the arrest or grant the extradition in cases where the
competent authorities consider that the offence is not sufficiently serious.
The two provisions are identical even in their paragraph and subpara-
graph numbering. They impose a duty upon the signatory state to punish
violations of this Convention by making such violations a crime under
municipal law, but do not disallow multiple prosecutions and repeated
punishment in every territory or state in violation of the principle of double
jeopardy (NE BIS IN IDEM). s Significantly, they make conspiracy a
crime even though that type of offense is peculiar only to the Anglo-
American legal system and those countries which have been inspired by
the common law. The penal provisions further provide for a partial recogni-
tion of foreign judgments with respect to recidivists without regard for the
rights of the offender in such cases and fail to set forth the basis for such
cooperation between states with respect to the recognition and conse-
quences of foreign penal convictions. The most astonishing observation is
that these penal provisions do not require states to include the offense of
illicit narcotic traffic (cultivation, manufacturing, sale, transportation and
their derivative operations) in their extradition treaties or reciprocal prac-
tices. Even when a state agrees to extradite such offenders, the provisions
have an astounding escape clause which is that if in the opinion of the state
of refuge the offense is "not sufficiently serious," it does not have to extra-
dite the accused offender. Recognizing the principle "universality" by al-
lowing any state wherein the offender may be found to prosecute for the
offense as an alternative to extradition, it nonetheless only suggests the
"desirability" to make it an extraditable offense. No wonder so few treaties
contain such violations in their list of extraditable offenses.29 This defect
was cured in the 1972 Amending Protocol discussed below.
A particularly laudable feature which appears in the Psychotropic
Convention is its concern with treatment of drug-dependent persons, even
though the premise is likely to remain hollow and its implementation very
doubtful in the case of many signatories.
See however Art. 36, § 2a, iv; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 17, at 127-37.
For a list of U.S. Treaties see Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 3.
NARCOTICS CONTROL SYSTEM
Article 22-1
(b) Notwithstanding the preceding sub-paragraph when abusers of
psychotropic substances have committed such offences, the Parties may pro-
vide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to
punishment, that such abusers undergo measures of treatment, education,
after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration in conformity with para-
graph 1 of article 20.
Article 20 deals with measures against the abuse of psychotropic sub-
stances and requires that:
1. The Parties shall take all practicable measures for the prevention of
abuse of psychotropic substances and for the early identification, treatment,
education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons
involved and shall co-ordinate their efforts to these ends;
2. The Parties shall as far as possible promote the training of personnel in
the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of abusers
of psychotropic substances;
3. The Parties shall assist persons whose work so requires to gain an under-
standing of the problems of abuse of psychotropic substances and of its
prevention, and shall also promote such understanding among the general
public if there is a risk that abuse of such substances will become widespread.
Such humane understanding has not been prevalent in other treaties,
but suggests that over-emphasis on punitive and retributive conceptions
of narcotics control are giving way to a more scientific and humanitarian
approach. This is a major difference in the sanctions orientation of both
treaties since the provision dealing with treatment of drug-dependent per-
sons in the Single Convention states, article 38:
1. The Party shall give special attention to the provision of facilities for the
medical treatment, care and rehabilitation of drug addicts.
2. If a Party has a serious problem of drug addiction and its economic
resources permit, it is desirable that it establish adequate facilities for the
effective treatment of drug addicts.
The approach is recommendatory as in the advisability clause on ex-
tradition mentioned above and not mandatory. In a decade there has been
no change in the language of the penal provisions and its extradition
clause, but the concern over drug dependence took a more positive tone.
It should be noted that WHO has suggested since the fifties that the
term "addiction" and "habituation" be replaced by that of "dependence"
and has since sponsored many studies on this subject. It has also initiated
the use of the term "abuser" instead of "addict." This new terminology
was not used in the 1961 Single Convention, but appears in the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances and it is not clear if the reason for it was
dictated by the differences between the types of drugs covered in the 1961
Single Convention as distinguished from Psychotropic Substances or be-
cause of popular acceptance of the conceptual significance of both terms.
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The results of scientific tests and pharmacological distinctions be-
tween cannabis sativa drugs, opium-morphine and cocaine are not re-
flected in either of these Conventions (other than in the schedules) which
are primarily penal sanctions oriented and only secondarily treatment-
rehabilitation conscious. In this respect the Psychotropic Convention is
more attuned to contemporary scientific research findings than its 1961
predecessor. One reason may well be the decade of scientific research that
separates both of these conventions.
c. The 1972 Geneva Protocol Amending the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs"
On May 20, 1971, ECOSOC called a plenipotentiary conference to
consider proposed amendments to the 1961 Single Convention. All signato-
ries were eligible to participate, as well as all members of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies. The conference was convened at Ge-
neva and 97 participants were registered, of which 3 were observers.
The amendment process had been initiated by the United States in
March, 1971 (as discussed earlier in the text), and in October, 1971,
France, Peru and Sweden proposed additional amendments. The amend-
ments proposed were revised and sponsored by 19 nations3' but shortly
before the conference convened, an additional 11 nations32 became spon-
sors.
The conference adopted the Amending Protocol by a vote of 71 in
favor, none against and 12 abstentions and is now open for signatures to
all parties to the Single Convention (or parties adhering thereto) and will
enter into force upon adhesions by 40 nations. To date 36 have adhered.3
3 U.N. Doc. E/Conf 63/8 (1972).
31 Argentina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France,
Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Italy, Laos, Norway, Panama, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Uruguay.
31 Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatamala, Indonesia, Ireland, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
1 Amending Protocol of Geneva Has Been Signed Subject to Ratification by Following Coun-
tries, as of March 27, 1972:
Argentina Guatemala Monaco
Belgium Haiti Nicaragua
Brazil Holy See Norway
Chile Indonesia Philippines
Costa Rica Iran South Africa
Cyprus Israel Spain
Denmark Italy Sweden
Ecuador Ivory Coast Togo
Egypt Jordan Turkey
Federal Republic of Cambodia United Kingdom
Germany Liberia United States
France Liechtenstein Venezuela
Ghana Luxembourg Viet-Nam
Greece Madagascar Yugoslavia
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The Amending Protocol continues to rely on the indirect scheme of
control depending too significantly on governmental cooperation without
direct enforcement sanction or even independent fact-finding machinery.
Nonetheless, it did make certain notable improvements in the present
system. They are:
1. Increased competence of the Board: heretofore the Board's author-
ity extended primarily to licit cultivation, production, manufacture, trade
and use of narcotic drugs. The Board is now enlisted in the efforts to
control illicit traffic and, therefore, in being so charged, is given increased
competence and broader responsibilities.
2. Reorganization of the Board: The Board is to be enlarged, made
more representative, insured of continuity by staggering the terms of its
members, strengthened by the appointment of its secretary by the
Secretary-General and made more independent through the choice of its
administrative personnel to be supplied by the General-Secretariat.
3. The Estimate System: is to be tightened by requiring more and
new information on forms provided by the Board who will devise a method
of checks to insure compliance and determine with greater accuracy ascer-
tainable areas of cultivation.
4. Informational Input: It will receive information from a wider range
of sources, including the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies and
certain inter-governmental and accredited non-governmental organiza-
tions with competence in drug matters. Signatories must also, in addition
to the new estimate procedure, furnish information on all forms of illicit
drug activity from cultivation to usage.
5. Informational Output: The Board has the right to establish, com-
municate and publish its own estimates, even if governments disagree. It
can also make studies and reports, propose remedial action to governments
and use the vehicle of referring matters to the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs, ECOSOC and the General Assembly as a device to insure compli-
ance with the terms of the Convention. (This is probably the closest form
to a direct enforcement scheme that international cooperation has ever
achieved so far).
6. Control and Sanctions: The estimate system and all informational
measures are designed to accomplish the objective of control and indirect
sanction. In addition the Amending Protocol established other devices:
(A) If the Board has reason to believe that the aims of the Single Convention
are seriously endangered by the failure of a country to carry out its obliga-
tions or if there is evidence that a country has become or is in danger of
becoming an important center of illicit cultivation, production, manufacture
or consumption of narcotics, the Board will be able to ask the government in
question for explanations, or consultations, or take the initiative in proposing
an on-the-spot study of the situation designed to develop remedial measures
where those appear necessary; (non-governmental informational input de-
scribed in #3 above will be significant in setting this device in motion).
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(B) If a country fails to provide satisfactory explanations or to adopt remedial
measures when requested to do so, or if the Board believes a serious situation
exists which requires cooperative remedial action, it may call this to the
attention of all other parties, ECOSOC and the United Nations Commission
on Narcotic Drugs, with appropriate recommendations and with potential
submission of the matter to the General Assembly. It is significant that for
the first time in history parties to an international narcotics treaty consider
the drug situation to be so serious and so universal that it may merit the
attention of the most representative United Nations' political organ.
(C) The Board is furthermore required to refer to ECOSOC if the aims of the
convention are endangered and the matter has not been satisfactorily re-
solved.
(D) If in any country producing licit opium there is evidence of diversion into
illicit traffic, the Board may, 90 days after notifying the government con-
cerned, require that country to reduce its production in the following year.
7. Extradition: Although a control device, extradition in this case is
used indirectly as such. The Amending Protocol fills a notorious gap in this
area. Extradition of violators of the 1961 Single Convention as amended
by this protocol is mandatory. These offenses must be included in treaties
and extradition must be granted in the absence of a treaty. It still requires
another positive step on the part of signatories which is to amend their
extradition treaties in accordance with this new provision. This provision
was patterned along the 1970 Hague Convention amending the 1963 Tokyo
Convention on Aircraft Hijacking. The Amending Protocol, however, has
an exception in cases where the narcotics offense is not deemed sufficiently
serious in which case extradition is no longer mandatory. The caveat that
states can make reservation on this clause weakens it.
8. Technical Assistance: The Board will be authorized to recommend
to competent United Nations organs and Specialized Agencies that techni-
cal and financial assistance be provided to governments in support of their
efforts to carry out their obligations under the Single Convention as
amended.
9. Treatment and Rehabilitation: All parties to the Single Conven-
tion as amended will be committed to give special attention to the preven-
tion of drug abuse, to the treatment, education, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of persons affected by drugs. Consistent with this is the provi-
sion for making available to abusers of narcotic drugs, either as an alterna-
tive to conviction or punishment or in addition to punishment, measures
of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration.
10. Preventive Measures: Realizing the importance of curbing user-
demand, the Amending Protocol relied on the rehabilitative approach
mentioned in #9 and also proposed that governments undertake such pro-
grams as drug education and other measures to prevent drug abuse.
The accomplishments of the Geneva Conference were noteworthy even
if many provisions of the Amending Protocol are couched in terms of a
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"best efforts" clause. The indirect scheme has progressed in the direction
of a more effective international control scheme, particularly in view of the
prevailing difficulties to achieve harmonious cooperative undertakings at
the international level.
III
THE SUPPRESSION OF ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN DANGEROUS DRUGS
AND NARCOTICS UNDER THE PRESENT SCHEME
OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
The illicit traffic in drugs and the criminal activities of smugglers are
of concern to the world community without distinction. The top organizers
of the international illicit traffic do not in most cases physically handle any
drugs themselves, but instigate, finance and direct these operations which
are carried out by underlings and then diffused to the users by pushers who
perpetuate and disseminate these drugs as part of an organized snowball-
ing system.
The international nature of the offense ideally requires the application
of the principle of universality of jurisdiction in national crime legislation
and calls for punishment of violators irrespective of their nationality or the
place of their crime. Thus, where international traffickers cannot be prose-
cuted in the country in which they are found, they should be extradited to
a country which is willing to try them, but this is not accomplished by a
"desirability" clause in narcotics treaties, but by a mandatory clause cou-
pled with a multilateral extradition treaty as part of the international
control system.
The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dan-
gerous Drugs introduced the optional principle of universality for adoption
by municipal penal legislation to ensure that illicit traffickers would not
escape prosecution because of lack of criminal jurisdiction. The adoption
of municipal uniform penal sanctions, however, is a very difficult task
because of ideological and political divergences and different cultural tra-
ditions on which this type of legal control ultimately depends. The 1936
Convention limited itself to the formulation of rather vague provisions
accompanied by escape clauses, in order to secure adherence by countries
which would otherwise never accept stipulations basically different from
their national standards. The 1961 Single Convention expresses only the
desirability of making narcotic crimes subject to extradition (a provision
it takes over from the 1936 treaty), but if the Amending Protocol enters
into force it would be mandatory. The Parties to it are to take action
against the illicit traffic and to provide for the punishment of narcotic
offenses but it does not distinguish between international traffickers, local
pushers, dealers, users and addicts. It requires that parties should make
arrangements at the national level for co-ordinating preventive and repres-
sive action against illicit traffic by setting up special agencies for such
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coordination and for assisting each other in fighting the illicit traffic by
exchanging information and legal papers for the purpose of prosecuting
offenders. The way these obligations are worded they are no more than a
"best efforts" clause. Governments are required to furnish the Secretary-
General particulars of each important case of illicit traffic, the source from
which drugs are obtained for such illicit traffic and the methods employed
by illicit traffickers. This type of data report is wholly ineffective in prac-
tice even though in theory perfectly laudable. The 1972 proposed amend-
ments are intended to remedy this shortcoming, but it is doubtful that they
will do more than improve the dissemination of information.
Governments have recognized after decades of narcotics treaties that,
in order to be effective, penalties imposed on traffickers must have a deter-
ring effect in which the penalty overweighs, in the eyes of the potential
offender, the benefits of the prohibited activity. Only recently, however,
have all countries enacted prison terms rather than fines for such viola-
tions. Some countries have even introduced capital punishment for certain
crimes in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, especially when minors are
exploited or led into addiction. But these measures have largely proven to
be ineffective as the number of narcotics users and abusers is on the in-
crease throughout the world.
Prevention and enforcement of narcotics violations is still the most
cloak-and-dagger undercover activity in existence. It is often the result of
years of work involving many persons, some of whom need to maintain
their secret identity. Such an activity is, therefore, not likely to be printed
in the United Nations Secretary-General Report on "the last catch," and
invaluable cooperation which should be institutionalized is relegated to
personal exchanges of confidences between agents or agencies who have
developed some form of working relationship.
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs reviews annually the general
problem of illicit trade in individual drugs as well as the situation of the
international traffic on a country-by-country basis. This review is based
on information supplied by governments and such other sources as
interpol. Although the seizure reports furnished by governments may show
here and there a decrease in the quantity of drugs seized in illicit trade as
indicating effective control, the recent surveys of the Commission indicate
that, on the whole, the illicit traffic remains at a high level and remains
well organized.
The most important drugs in the illicit traffic (both international and
local) are still opium and the opiates (principally morphine and heroin)
which continue to present the greatest problem to national and interna-
tional authorities. Opium originates mainly in the Middle East, in a well-
defined triangular area in South East Asia along the borders of Burma,
Thailand, and Laos and in the Peoples' Democratic Republic of China
which is producing and exporting an unknown quantity of drugs, since it
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is outside the international control scheme. In the Middle East, some
opium seems to escape local control where it is licitly cultivated, but most
of it comes from illicit cultivation. The 1970 report of the International
Narcotics Control Board stated the problem, ". . . even if leakage from
licit production could be virtually extinguished smugglers would still be
able to have recourse to opium which is produced illegally or beyond gov-
ernment control. There are now extensive areas of such production and it
is essential that, side by side with reinforcing monopoly controls over licit
production, major efforts should be made to eliminate poppy cultivation
in these areas. . . . The regions chiefly involved are situated in Afghani-
stan, Burma, Laos and Thailand; and there is also some production in
parts of Latin America. "14 The profit is so great in the area of illicit produc-
tion that it will be impossible for these countries to be wholly successful
in containing such activity. Adding to it the volume of individual travelers
makes attempts at control at best haphazard. There is no system of inter-
national customs cooperation or data bank for international exchange of
information. INTERPOL, however, maintains a reference operation and
signals individuals to customs or police officials, but their activity is natu-
rally limited.
Opium, as is well known, is used in clandestine factories for the manu-
facture of morphine, which is then converted into heroin. Morphine and
particularly heroin are much more potent than opium and much less
bulky, thus much easier to smuggle to countries such as the United States,
Canada, Thailand, and Vietnam, where drug dependence especially to
heroin has become a serious problem as it has also in other countries such
as in Iran and Hong Kong. The United States, for example, has an esti-
mated addiction population of half a million drug-dependent persons, but
its breakdown as to typology of drug users is very uncertain. An estimated
3.5 billion dollars is spent on illicit drugs in the United States annually.
Smuggling heroin is very profitable and not easily detectable. At a time
when world trade expansion requires the reduction of administrative and
customs controls and the volume of international trade is so great, the task
of customs detection is extraordinary. On June 30, 1971, Prime Minister
Erim of Turkey declared:
We cannot allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige of our
nation to be further shaken. Our government has decided to apply a clear and
firm solution. It forbids completely the planting of poppies . . ..
Poppies will not be planted in Turkey beginning next year. . ..
This laudable step is not likely to completely prevent illicit production
since wherever cultivation was permitted it had always been government
controlled. Some illicit cultivation is still expected to take place until
U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9 (1970).
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modern techniques such as aerial and ground inspection can be used as
well as the maintenance of a permanent governmental control structure.
Hopefully, Turkey will continue to be vigilant even if the decree abolishing
any licit cultivation is likely to take the heat off its public agencies. It is
also noteworthy that Thailand started a pilot program of crop substitution
to curtail the extent of traditionally legal opium growing. Unfortunately,
Iran decided in 1969 to resume poppy cultivation to the extent necessary
to satisfy its own internal demand. The INCB has expressed grave concern
over reports that poppy cultivation in Iran is to be markedly increased in
the near future.
Cannabis sativa in its various forms, such as marijuana and hashish,
continues to be in quantitative terms the biggest narcotic substance in the
international illicit traffic; financially heroin is still the largest money
producer. Cannabis-type plants grow in many parts of the world with great
ease and represent, therefore, a particularly difficult problem to enforce-
ment agencies. In the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America this
drug crosses frontiers in bulk, although in some countries it is mainly a
domestic problem. Cocaine from coca leaves grown mainly in Latin Amer-
ica appears in the international traffic on a smaller scale than opium and
heroin, but the traffic in this drug seems to be spreading through Latin
America and to other parts of the world. The reason is that it is much less
in demand which confirms the idea that priority should be given to curtail-
ing demand and curbing the profit motive. Analysts of these problems tend
to look at them more in terms of law enforcement than of user-demand.
This is why the international concern as well as that of most states is with
repressive penal sanctions rather than curtailing user-demand by scientific
means and developing a method of direct control over production and
manufacturing of all such drugs and curbing the profit incentive of those
engaged in this type of illicit activity.
It is true by and large that the illicit traffic is unable to obtain any
significant supplies of drugs from legally-manufactured channels except
for synthetic drugs wherein seizures have been seriously increasing in re-
cent years and are often retraceable to licit channels of manufacturing,
particularly amphetamines and other stimulants and depressants stolen in
the course of trade.
The recent increase in illicit narcotics traffic has been attributed to
four factors: more raw narcotic materials are being processed closer to the
place of cultivation; the tremendous increase in non-syndicate drug traf-
fickers; the new interest of the youth of the Western countries in the
cultures of the Eastern part of the world; and the greater speed and facility
of transport available to drug traffickers. The means of transportation in
the international illicit traffic are not limited to ships and their crew mem-
bers as governments' seizure reports point to a growing use of commercial
and private aircraft by traffickers. In 1952, the Economic and Social Coun-
cil recommended that the Secretary-General compile and bring up to date
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at regular intervals a list of merchant seafarers and members of the civil
air crews who have been convicted of narcotic offenses on or after January
1, 1953. Such crew members are to be blacklisted and not employed again
onboard ships or aircraft, as the case may be, but little ever came of that
device. Another method of transportation is the ordinary tourist and the
unwary courier. The extraordinary increase in tourism and business travel
makes thorough individual customs inspection a practical impossibility.
Customs agencies are on the horns of a dilemma: should they ease their
inspections to make the tourist feel welcome or be thorough and catch the
smuggler? Economic realism makes most countries opt for the former mea-
sure. Another channel must not be discounted and that is the regular
shipment of goods in international trade. Most narcotic drugs are easily
concealable and can be shipped with goods and merchandise without too
much fear of discovery in customs. The only reason it is not used frequently
is fear that intermediate handlers of the legitimate merchandise may find
it and take it, not fear of customs seizure.
Valuable help in combating illicit traffic and activities of traffickers
is rendered by INTERPOL, which acts as a clearing house for national law
enforcement agencies. The organization, whose headquarters is in Paris,
provides information on illicit traffic to the organs of international and
national narcotics control and usually participates, through an observer,
in the Commission's meetings. It organizes conferences and seminars for
national police forces and other services such as customs. INTERPOL
remains, however, an agency without supranational power and is not, as
the name suggests, a true international police.
The Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat
carries out research in its laboratory in Geneva, and national laboratories
and individual scientists in various parts of the world also participate in
the United Nations program of drug research. The laboratory helped to co-
ordinate opium research that was carried out by scientists throughout the
world and arranged for the distribution of opium samples for this work.
Some of the laboratory research is on the analysis of government authenti-
cated samples of opium which originated or were discovered in that coun-
try. Several scientific methods have been developed and after extensive
testing are now conclusively applied to determine the geographical origin
of samples of opium seized in illicit traffic and thus help to poinpoint its
illicit origin.
The United Nations, cognizant of the importance of curbing user-
demand for illicit drugs, instituted a program of drug abuse control in
March 1971. In an Aide-Memoire released by the Secretary-General it was
stated:
3. The demand for drugs comes from large numbers of addicts and
habitual abusers in many parts of the world, and it stimulates both produc-
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tion and the illicit traffic. To diminish demand, addicts and abusers must
be treated and reintegrated as productive members of society. This treatment
and reintegration cannot follow a wholly uniform pattern everywhere, but
must be based on studies which take full account of social and economic
conditions, cultural traditions, etc., in each country or region. Moreover,
demand must also be reduced by preventive measures, which include educa-
tion, particularly of young people in the dangers of drug-taking and addic-
tion. In developing countries, measures to reduce the demand require the
help of developed countries. If such help is not forthcoming, there is a serious
risk that addiction will spread from new sources of contagion, and that new
centres for the illicit traffic will come into being.
4. The repression of the illicit traffic requires the strengthening of en-
forcement action in many countries of the world. No country can defend itself
against the illicit traffic without the cooperation of other countries, and com-
mon efforts will have to be undertaken on the international level to deal with
this aspect.
5. The purpose of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control will
be to develop short-term and long-term plans and programmes along the
lines indicated above, and to provide assistance in the execution of those
plans and programmes. During the initial stages of the Fund, pending the
completion and submission of a proposed long-term policy and plan of action
which would deal with all aspects of the problems related to drug abuse
control, the voluntary contributions to the Fund will be used for specific
projects to be included in a short-term programme without prejudice to on-
going projects. The short-term programme will consist of projects to expand
the research and information facilities of United Nations drug-control bodies;
to plan and implement programmes of technical assistance in pilot projects
for crop substitution purposes, the establishment and improvement of na-
tional drug-control administrations and enforcement machinery, the training
of personnel, and in setting up or expanding research and training centres
which could serve national or regional needs; to enlarge the capabilities and
extend the operations of United Nations drug-control bodies and their secre-
tariats; to promote facilities for the treatment, rehabilitation and social rein-
tegration of drug addicts; and to develop educational material and pro-
grammes suitable for use on high-risk populations. 5
The Fund shall be financed through voluntary national contributions and
after one year of interim administration, it will be placed under the direc-
tion of the Division of Narcotic Drugs.
IV.
CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN
The indirect method of control bears its endemic weakness in that its
control scheme relies on the willingness and effectiveness of multiple par-
ticipants in a process in which not all share the same degree of concern and
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/1442 Sox/NAR/.104 (1971).
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interest. These weaknesses, discussed throughout this article, are only
some of those which persons concerned with the problem have identified
over the years. The general scheme of the alternative proposed is as fol-
lows:
1. A direct control scheme whereby an international agency would
have in the case of the opiates the monopoly of production, distribution,
warehousing and sale; in the cases of cocaine and cannabis sativa drugs,
the powers of indirect supervision; and in the case of psychotropic sub-
stances, local control devices; and
2. Minimum standards of treatment of drug-dependent persons
applicable indirectly by each state, but subject to the international
agency's supervision with an international financial subsidy scheme wher-
ever needed.
The Direct Control Scheme would be administered by an entirely
restructured International Narcotics Control Board, to be known as the
International Narcotics Control Agency, composed of six functional boards
(see organizational chart below). The International Narcotics Control
Agency would consist of twelve members elected for terms of four years
each by the General Assembly of the UN. The Secretary-General of the UN
would appoint a thirteenth member to act as Chairman of the Agency.
Each of the six boards under the Agency would be chaired by one member
of the Agency to be elected by the Agency for a term of two years.
The Functional Boards
1. The Central Board for the International Regulation of Drug
Traffic
This body would serve as a forceful regulatory force primarily estab-
lished to create and administer an international monopoly for the growing
of opium and the manufacture of morphine. It would select one or more
locations in the world for growing opium and manufacturing morphine.
The Board would subsidize countries presently growing poppies and super-
vise the transition to alternative crops to be grown by individuals who
would be economically injured by the scheme. In countries like Peru, which
are presently considering a program of general agrarian reform, this transi-
tional process could be instituted quite easily. This body would continue
the estimate and import-export certification systems. Only individuals,
governments or organizations licensed and supervised by this Board would
be permitted to engage in the production, manufacture, trade and/or dis-
tribution of opium and its derivatives. Any drug traffic outside the aus-
pices of this Board would be illicit and subject to international penal
sanctions.
This Board would be divided into regional sub-boards located
throughout the world wherever drug activity is prevalent. The Board would
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consist of six members plus the Chairman, each to be appointed by the
International Narcotics Control Agency for a renewable term of two years
each.
2. Central Drug Control Board
This body would constitute the enforcement arm for the direct control
scheme. It would function in three areas. Within a particular state, the
Central Drug ControIBoard would have the authority to direct and super-
vise arrests, seizures and investigations carried out by local officials. Al-
though this police force would not have the authority to make arrests itself,
it would be present and supervise law enforcement activities with respect
to internal narcotics control in a particular state.
This force would also have the responsibility of enforcing the monop-
oly structure. It would have the right of direct inspection with respect to
facilities operated by the monopoly and the right to impose a mandatory
embargo where a state did not conform to its obligations under the monop-
oly.
Third, the force would serve as a central clearinghouse for information
and statistics pertaining to the status of illicit drug trafficking in the world.
It would serve as a central data bank for such information as the identity
of present offenders and the location of suspected illicit growing of poppies.
Inasmuch as this Board would function in all areas of the world, re-
gional sub-boards would be established in key geographic locations. Simi-
larly, the membership on this Board should reflect a true international
representation. Suggested members would include: Secretary-General of
INTERPOL, Chief of the Division of Criminal Affairs of the Council of
Europe, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics Control of the Arab League, a
representative of the Organization of American States, and a representa-
tive of the Asian-Pacific Council. Each of these regional members would
supervise the activities of the regional office located in his area. The Inter-
national Narcotics Police would be staffed by the nationals in the country
in which it would function. To insure close cooperation between the Inter-
national Drug Control Board and the local authorities, each country would
be required to establish a Bureau of Narcotics Information and Control if
it has not done so already to act as liaison between the international and
local authorities.
3. Arbitration Board for the Resolution of Drug-Related Disputes
This body would serve as a convenient and rapid facility for the resolu-
tion of disputes involving drug activity. Along with the Chairman, the
members of this Board would include the Chief Justice of I.C.J., Deputy
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs in the UN and the Chairman of the
International Law Commission. These individuals would be instrumental
in setting up regional forums for arbitration when a dispute arises. The
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parties would choose one member of the Board to act as umpire and each
party would choose an arbitrator to form a tribunal. Decisions of the tri-
bunal would be binding upon the parties but reviewable by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Significantly, individuals and organizations of any
sort would have standing before any tribunal set up by this Board.
4. Clearing House Commission
This body would act as an open market for the purchase and sale of
drug substances. It would be available to individuals and organizations as
well as states. Hopefully, this body would serve as a means to funnel-off
drugs from the channels of illicit drug traffic. Upon receipt of a quantity
of drugs the Commission could then resell them for medical or scientific
purposes through the structure of the monopoly.
In addition to the Chairman, two members would be appointed to the
Commission and would be authorized to set price levels and establish
regional offices in strategic locations throughout the world.
5. Central Board for the Treatment and Study of Drug-Dependence
This Board would assume the responsibility of establishing Minimum
Standards of Treatment of Drug-Dependent Persons. Its activities would
attempt to locate treatment centers throughout the world through direct
activities where a country is unable to establish its own treatment centers.
The Board would operate a central facility devoted to the study and re-
search of the aspect of drug dependence. This central facility would freely
supply information regarding drug dependence to interested parties. The
expertise of WHO and FAO would be utilized in the administration of
these programs.
Some of the minimal standards of treatment of drug-dependent per-
sons would include:
(a) Recognition that drug dependence is a disease and that as such is better
controlled by treatment than by imprisonment.
(b) Recognition of a distinction between the dependence-creating proper-
ties of the three main categories of drugs, i.e., opium and its derivatives and
cocaine, psychotropic substances and cannabis sativa and its derivatives.
The Board would seek to establish standards for:
(a) what constitutes dependence.
(b) how should treatment be given for each type of drug dependence.
(c) what are the harmful physiological and/or psychological effects resulting
from the use of specific drug substances.
The Board would consist of five members besides the Chairman and
each would be appointed by the Chairman, perhaps from the personnel in
the WHO or the FAO, for terms of two years each.
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6. Central Legislative Board
This body consisting of seven members appointed by the Chairman,
would assume the responsibility of establishing a proposed model statute
concerning the prevention of drug-related offenses and the enforcement of
such legislation. Such legislation should be based on clearly drawn distinc-
tions among the three categories of drugs listed above, and should recog-
nize the relationship between the social harm of the offense and the pen-
alty imposed. Distinctions should also be made between: (a) international
traffickers, (b) local pushers and dealers, (c) casual users, and (d) drug-
dependent persons. Each category should be treated differently for pur-
poses of prevention, enforcement, repression and treatment-rehabilitation
legislation. Legislation should give the WHO the authority to add or re-
move any drug or substance from international control. Any model treaty-
statute should include the following:
(a) The classification of the crime of international drug trafficking as an
"international crime" with offenders subject to universal jurisdiction.
(b) Provisions for mandatory extradition with the right of review before the
International Court of Justice with equal standing for individual recourses
as well as states and International Narcotics Control Agency."
(c) A clear prohibition on the production of opium upon countries not au-
thorized to grow under the monopoly.
(d) Provisions allowing direct inspection in producing countries to insure
that all drugs remain in licit channels.
(e) Provision that all substances containing drugs shall carry an interna-
tional designation of such, not just the proprietary name.
(f) Provisions allowing for the complete restructuring of the international
control scheme as outlined above with the emphasis upon direct controls and
the establishment of minimal standards of treatment of drug-dependent per-
sons.
(g) Provisions allowing for the "decriminalization" of the use of cannabis
sativa products. Penalties for possession would be abolished. Selected manu-
facturers would be selected and licensed to produce and distribute limited
quantities of marijuana products. This proposal would be based on several
assumptions:
1. that the health hazards in a purified, limited and carefully pro-
cessed dosage of cannabis sativa will be reduced to the level of tobacco
cigarettes.
2. that the use of cannabis sativa does not create a physiological
dependence and that the degree of psychological dependence which it
purportedly creates is doubtful.
3. that the systems of criminal justice in the world will be freed from
This proposal was made by the author to the Xth International Law Congress of Rome in
1969 in the American National Report; Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of
the Contemporary American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 39 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE
DRorr PENAL 494 (1968), reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. REv. 733 (1969).
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the heavy burden of enforcing the restrictions against petty cannabis
sativa.
4. that the sale of cannabis sativa could be regulated by location and
age of user.
5. that such a program would give a flexibility in which more serious
penal sanctions could be imposed if science proves the use of cannabis
sativa to be more harmful than at present and similarly that controls
could be liberalized if the opposite proves to be true.
6. that each country could capably control the licensing procedures,
with standards for such licensing set by an international agency.
By necessity, such a treaty-statute could only become obligatory upon
the countries of the world by their voluntary acceptance of such.
It is the opinion of this writer that the present international scheme
served its purpose so far but must give way to a direct international control
system; that there is no alternative to a concurrent program of curtailing
user-demand and curbing the profit incentive in illicit traffic and trade.
The President's Commission on Marijuana released some of its findings
which support a form of decriminalization for users. The proposal outlined
above may hopefully trigger an interest in the development of an alterna-
tive international control scheme to the present one which proved so
ineffective judging by the increased rate of drug dependence everywhere
in the world, even though that system was achieved arduously and over
the span of half a century. It remains nonetheless, as it always was, one
step behind the needs it was to serve.
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APPENDIX I
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
International Opium Convention signed at The Hague on 23 January 1912.
International Opium Convention signed at Geneva on 19 February 1925,
as amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11
December 1946.
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution
of narcotic drugs, signed at Geneva on 13 July 1931, as amended by the
Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11 December 1946.
Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, signed at
Bangkok on 27 November 1931, as amended by the Protocol signed at Lake
Success, New York, on 11 December 1946.
Convention for the suppression of the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs,
signed at Geneva on 26 June 1936, as amended by the Protocol signed at
Lake Success, New York, on 11 December 1946.
Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Nar-
cotic Drugs concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11
February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27
November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, signed at Lake Success,
New York, 11 December 1946.
Protocol signed at Paris on 19 November 1948 bringing under international
control drugs outside the scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for limit-
ing the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as
amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11 Decem-
ber 1946.
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the
production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium,
signed at New York on 23 June 1953.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, signed at New York on 30 March
1961.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna, 21 February
1971.
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APPENDIX II
BOARD OF WORLD EXPERTS ON NARCOTICS CONTROL
Prof. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman
Professor of Law, De Paul University
25 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604
Mr. James R. Silverwood, Secretary
1411 Sherwin Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60626
The Honorable Yehia Aboubakr
Permanent Observer
League of Arab States
405 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Prof. S. K. Agrawala
Professor of Law
Head of Law Department
University of Poona
Ganeshkhind, Poona 7
India
Mr. Philip Werner Amram
Attorney at Law
Amram, Hahn and Sundlun
Colorado Building
Washington, D.C.
Prof. J. Andenaes
Professor of Law
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway
Prof. Richard Arens
Professor of Law
University of Toronto
Toronto 181, Canada
The Honorable Roland Berger
Director, Office of Youth
Department of Public Instruction
34 Boulevard Saint-Georges
Geneva, Switzerland
Prof. R. Bierzanek
Professor International Law
University of Warsaw
Broniewskiego ILC
Warszawa 80, Poland
Prof. Richard B. Bilder
Professor of Law
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
Prof. Pierre Bouzat
Professor of Law
University of Rennes
President/Association Internationale de
droit Penal
43 Avenue Aristide Briand
Rennes, France
Mr. Stephen Boyd
Assistant Legal Advisor
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20006
Mr. Albert Brunois
Attorney at Law
President/Paris Bar Association
Paris, France
Major Jerry Butler
Director of International Division
Air Force Judge Advocate General
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20036
Avv. Giacomo Barletta Caldarera
Attorney at Law
11 Via Milo
Catania, Italy
Mr. Art Curry
Ministry of Justice,
Criminal Law Division,
Toronto, Canada
Prof. Samuel Dash
Professor of Law
Director/Criminal Justice Institute
Georgetown University
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
J. Y. Dautricourt, Judge
Palais de Justice
Rue de l'Oree, 56
1040 Bruxelles, 1, Belgium
Prof. John F. Decker
Assistant Professor of Law
De Paul University
25 East Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Prof. Rodolfo DeNova
Professor of Law
Facolta di Giurisprudenza
University of Pavia
Pavia, Italy
Dr. Ihsan Diab
Dept. of Pharmacology
University of Chicago
School of Medicine
947 East 58th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
Prof. Yoram Dinstein
Professor of Int'l Law
University of Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv, Israel
Prof. Bulent Nuri Esen
Professor of Law
University of Ankara
Ankara, Turkey
Mr. Courtney A. Evans
Attorney at Law
Suite 500
1320 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dr. Pierre Franck
Avocat General de la Cour d'Appel
Paris, France
Prof. B. James George
Professor of Law
Director/Criminal Justice Center
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Professor Albert Hess
Professor of Criminology
State University of New York
Brockport, New York
Prof. J. Hulsman
Professor of Criminal Law
Director/Criminal Law Studies
University of Rotterdam
Rotterdam, Netherlands
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Prof. Pinter Jeno
Professor of Criminal Law
University of Budapest
Eutuos Lorand Tudomanye Gyetem
Allam-Es Jog Tudomangi Kar
V, Egyetem Teri-3
Budapest, Hungary
Prof. Sanford H. Kadish
Professor of Law
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Prof. John Kaplan
Professor of Law
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305
Prof. Nicholas N. Kittrie
Professor of Law
Director/Institute for Studies in Justice
and Social Behavior
American University
Washington, D.C.
Jose Guardadao Lopes
Director of Prisons
Trau. da Cruz do Torrel No 1
Lisboa, Portugal
Prof. W. Thomas Mallison
Professor of Law
Director/International Studies
George Washington University
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dr. Curt Markees
Scientific Counselor
Division of Police
Department of Federal Justice & Police
Berne, Switzerland
Mr. Marcellus R. Meek
Attorney at Law and Prof. of Int'l Law
John Marshall Law School
315 South Plymouth Court
Chicago, Illinois
Mr. Albert Metzger
Attorney at Law
21-23 Siaka Stevery Street
Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone
Prof. Gerhard 0. W. Muller
Professor of Law
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Director/CLEAR Center
New York University
31 West 4th Street
New York, New York 10012
Prof. Ved P. Nanda
Professor of Law
Director/International Studies
University of Denver
Denver, Colorado
Prof. Dietrich Oehler
Professor of Law
Director/Criminal Law Studies Institute
University of Cologne
Gott Fried-Keller-Strasse 2
5 Koln 41
Germany
Prof. Peter Papadatos
Professor of Law
University of Messina
Corso, Italia 298
Catania, Italy
The Honorable Hector Solis Quiroga
Director/General of Juvenile Courts
Quetzal Num 3
Mexico 21, DF Mexico
Prof. W. Michael Reisman
Professor of Law
Yale University, School of Law
New Haven, Connecticut 06520
Mr. Charles Siragusa
Executive Director/Illinois Investigating
Crime Commission
Former Deputy Director/Federal Bureau
of Narcotics
300 West Washington
Chicago, Illinois
Prof. Ralph Slovenko
Professor of Law
Wayne State University
School of Law
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Criton G. Tornaritis
Attorney General of the Republic of
Cyprus
Nicosia, Cyprus
Ms. Christine van Sweiten
Palais de Justice
Rue de l'Oree, 56
1040 Bruxelles, 1, Belgium
Ms. Johanna Vanderaart
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Research Associate/CLEAR Center
New York University
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Mr. Mitchel Ware
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